Cybersecurity · Network and cloud security
A cloud environment that stays configured the way you agreed
We set up your cloud account structure, network separation, workload identity and runtime protection. Policies are checked automatically whenever a change is proposed, rather than reported a week later. Success is not measured by a security score. It is measured by whether a misconfiguration can reach production at all.
Where this starts
Most cloud breaches start with a configuration mistake
Most cloud incidents begin with a configuration mistake rather than a software vulnerability. Common examples are an exposed storage bucket, a role with too many permissions, a management port open to the internet, or a network with no internal separation because that was going to be done later. None of these are sophisticated. They persist because nothing in the delivery process prevents them, and nothing detects them quickly.
What we usually find
- A security tool reporting hundreds of findings that nobody reviews
- Infrastructure defined as code, then changed by hand and never brought back into line
- A flat network, where an attacker who gets in can reach everything
- Production and test environments sharing accounts, roles or network routes
- Kubernetes clusters running with default permissions and no network rules
- Long-lasting cloud keys stored in pipelines, instead of short-lived credentials
Our position
Finding a misconfiguration a week after it goes live is far worse than stopping it before it is merged. It also costs more to manage for the rest of the system’s life.
What the work covers
Get the foundations right, then enforce them
We fix the structure before adding controls. In a badly structured environment, the list of security findings never ends. Once the structure is right, enforcement is cheap and the list becomes manageable.
Cloud account structure
We separate environments and limit how far a single problem can spread. Guardrails are applied across the whole organisation, so every new account starts with the right standard rather than having to be fixed later.
Network separation and outbound control
We separate the network to reflect how your services actually communicate, connect to managed services privately, and control outbound traffic. Controlling outbound traffic means an attacker who gets in is contained, rather than able to copy your data out.
Workload identity
We replace permanent keys with short-lived credentials, and set permissions based on what services actually use rather than on guesswork. We also plan, in stages, the removal of long-standing access that nobody has yet been willing to take away.
Kubernetes and container runtime
We set up checks that reject unsigned or non-compliant workloads, network rules that block traffic by default, standard pod security settings, and runtime monitoring where the workload justifies it. How the container images themselves are built and secured is covered under application security.
Automated policy checks
Policies are checked against every proposed infrastructure change. A public storage bucket or an open management port fails the review, with the exact rule and line that caused it. We also detect changes made by hand outside the normal process, because they will always happen, often during an emergency.
Hardening and patching
We set secure baselines against recognised benchmarks, rebuild server images on a regular schedule instead of patching them in place, and automate rollouts. You get a figure for how quickly patches are applied, which you can report to an auditor or your board.
How it stays fixed
Prevent problems where possible, and detect them where not
Each control below sits in one of two places. In the pipeline, it prevents problems. In the live environment, it detects and corrects them. Very little of this belongs in a quarterly review.
- Plan
- Policies are checked against each planned infrastructure change. A failure names the specific rule, resource and line, so the fix is obvious and does not need investigating.
- Apply
- Organisation-wide guardrails cannot be overridden by a deployment. The pipeline is not the only thing stopping a rushed engineer from creating a public storage bucket.
- Admit
- The cluster rejects unsigned images, containers with administrator rights and workloads without resource limits before they run, rather than reporting them later.
- Detect
- Security and configuration findings go to the team that owns the account. The important ones have a response time, and the unimportant ones are deliberately left out.
- Correct
- Where the right fix is obvious, it is applied automatically. Everything else becomes a ticket with the full context.
What you are left with
- A documented cloud account and network structure, enforced across the organisation
- Automated policy checks that block changes breaking the rules you chose
- Detection of manual changes, with a named owner for each account
- A patching and baseline process, with a patching time you can report
- A list of security findings that is manageable and shrinking, rather than endless and ignored
Send us your cloud account structure and one infrastructure repository
We will come back with the three structural changes that would remove the most findings, before anyone is asked to buy another tool.